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USING THE LAW TO COMBAT SPORT
BUSINESS CORRUPTION
MARK DODDS* & BARBARA OSBORNE**

INTRODUCTION
Corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.1 It is perceived
to be common in the sports world. Research studies indicate that a majority of
sport fans consider sport to be corrupt.2 The United Nations sees corruption to
be an international issue.3 It states that all businesses should work against
corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.4 The United Nations

* Mark Dodds is a professor teaching sport law and sport marketing at the State University of New
York, College at Cortland. He holds a Sc.D. from the University of Jyväskylä (Finland), a J.D. from
Marquette University Law School, a M.B.A. from Robert Morris University and a B.S. in Marketing
Management from Syracuse University. While at MULS, he earned a Sport Law Certificate from the
National Sport Law Institute. His research area is focused on legal issues in sport business, and sport
corruption. He has published articles in journals such as: Sport Marketing Quarterly, International
Journal of Sport Management and Marketing, Journal of Brand Strategy, Journal of Sponsorship,
Marquette Sports Law Review, Case Studies in Sport Management, and College Athletics and the Law.
He co-edited the award-winning Encyclopedia of Sports Management and Marketing, Sports
Leadership: A Reference Guide., and the Routledge Handbook of International Sport Business. Prior
to arriving at SUNY Cortland, Mark worked in the sport marketing industry for over 12 years. He lives
in Cortland, New York with his wife and two children.
** Barbara Osborne is a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with a joint
appointment at the School of Law and the Exercise and Sport Science Department. Her research
interests are legal issues in college athletics, women’s issues in sports, and legal issues in sports
medicine. Osborne earned a B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, an M.Ed. with a
concentration in sports management from Boston University, and a J.D. from Boston College School
of Law.
1. What is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/en/what-iscorruption (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
2. See Mark Dodds et al., Impact of NCAA Corruption on the Adidas Brand, 16(1) SPORT MGMT.
INT’L J. 1, 1-9 (2020) [hereinafter Adidas Brand]; Mark Dodds et al., Corruption Impact on Sport
Sponsorship Strategy, 14(1) SPORT MGMT. INT’L J. 21, 21-33 (2018) [hereinafter Sponsorship
Strategy]; Mark Dodds, Consumer Impressions of Sport Corruption, 13(2) SPORT MGMT. INT’L J. 1, 8
(2017) [hereinafter Consumer Impressions].
3. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 4.
4. Id.
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Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) calls on nations to outlaw, at a
minimum: bribery of public officials; embezzlement; trading in influence; abuse
of function; illicit enrichment by public officials; bribery and embezzlement in
the private sector; money laundering; and obstruction of justice.5 The UNCAC
also encourages member nations to cooperate with corruption investigations.6
Furthermore, the UN specifically addressed corruption in sport with the creation
of a best practices document specifically tailored to prevent the activity in sport
sponsorship.7 Corruption in sport has become so problematic that global
corruption watchdog non-governmental organization Transparency
International published its research-based Global Corruption Report: Sport to
better define and understand this issue.8
Initially, sport corruption was focused on the game play and outcome and
the administration of sport.9 Maennig defined sport corruption within two
contexts: competition corruption and management corruption.10
Competition corruption involves the athletes, match officials, sport
organization personnel to influence the match itself.11 Match-fixing is behavior
that seeks to influence the final outcome of the competition.12 For instance, a
player who purposefully plays poorly to win a game by less than the point spread
(point shaving), an official making specific calls to cause one team to lose a
match, or an athlete using a prohibited item (equipment, performance enhancing
drug, etc.) to win game.13
Perhaps the most infamous example of match-fixing is Tim Donaghy.14
Donaghy was a long-time National Basketball Association referee.15 A two-year
investigation uncovered Donaghy conspiring to influence the outcomes of the
games that he officiated by calling less fouls for the team on which Donaghy

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. United Nations Global Compact, Fighting Corruption in Sport Sponsorship and Hospitality: A
Practical Guide for Companies, U.N. GLOB. COMPACT OFF. (2014), https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront
.net/docs/issues_doc%2FAntiCorruption%2FSportsSponsorshipHospitalityGuide.pdf.
8. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT (Gareth Sweeney
& Kelly McCarthy eds., 2016).
9. Wolfgang Maennig, Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms,
Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures, 5(2) EUR. SPORT MGMT. Q. 187, 187 (2005).
10. Id. at 189-90.
11. Id. at 190.
12. Id. at 189.
13. Id.
14. See Scott Eden, From the Archives: How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA
Games, ESPN (July 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-timdonaghy-conspired-fix-nba-games.
15. See id.
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placed bets.16 Donaghy pled guilty to gambling charges and was sentenced to
fifteen months in prison.17
Spot-fixing is behavior designed to impact the game play but not the final
outcome.18 Examples include a soccer player kicking the ball out of bounds
within the first minute to cover a proposition or prop bet or a tennis player
committing a specific number of double faults within a match.19 In a spot-fixing
situation, any player has an equal opportunity to influence the game.20 Although
these activities may not have a direct effect on the final outcome, many spot
wagering organizations allow bets for these types of actions.21
Management corruption focuses on the administration of sport. It involves
the host venues, allocation of rights, media, intellectual property, nomination
for positions, and commissioning constructions works for sports arenas focusing
on the administration of sport.22 For example, the Salt Lake Organizing
Committee (“SLOC”) was accused of providing more than $1.2 million in cash
and gifts (including Disneyland trips, free college scholarships, Super Bowl
trips, money for a mayoral campaign, jobs for kids, and two knee surgeries) to
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) members for their vote to host the
2002 Winter Olympics.23 Two members of the SLOC, Thomas Welch and
David Johnson, were charged with conspiracy, violations of the Travel Act, mail
fraud, and wire fraud.24 Although the IOC expelled six committee members
because of their participation in the scandal,25 neither Welch nor Johnson was

16. Id.
17. Tom Hays, NY Judge Sentences Tim Donaghy to 15 Months in Prison, SEATTLE TIMES (July
29, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/sports/nba/ny-judge-sentences-tim-donaghy-to15-months-in-prison/.
18. Tom Serby, The Council of Europe Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competitions: The
Best Bet for the Global Fight Against Match-Fixing?, 15(1-2) INT’L SPORTS L.J. 83, 84 (2015).
19. Id. at 85-86.
20. Id. at 85.
21. Id.
22. Maennig, supra note 9, at 190.
23. United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 2003); Duncan Mackay, Olympic
Bribery Scandal Refuses to Lie Down: Two Face Corruption Trial over Bid to Secure Salt Lake Games,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2003, 9:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/24/sport
.duncanmackay; Amy Shipley, Report Implicates More IOC Members, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/02/10/report-implicates-more-iocmembers/
1e620c80-484f-4478-8661-bef8977dbcb6/; Associated Press, Despite 2002 Bribery Scandal, Salt Lake
City Aims to Host 2030 Winter Olympics, CANADIAN BROAD. CORP. (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:33 PM),
https://www.cbc.ca/sports/olympics/salt-lake-city-2030-winter-olympics-1.4951389.
24. Welch, 327 F.3d at 1086.
25. Jere Longman, Olympics; Head of Olympics Expels 6 Members in Payoff Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/25/sports/olympics-head-of-olympics-expels-6members-in-payoff-scandal.html.
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convicted on the charges.26 Despite overwhelming evidence, the Utah jury was
reluctant to find the defendants guilty of fear of losing the games,27 and
rationalized that it’s the IOC’s behavior that caused this issue so why should
Utah citizens be punished for their response.28
Sport business corruption includes conduct with entities tangentially related
to the sport itself, such as sponsors.29 In this type of corruption, the action is not
directly related to sport, but sport provides a context or opportunity for the
corruption to occur. Bribery is a common action within the sport business
corruption context. Bribery is the directly or indirectly offering, giving,
accepting, or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action.30
Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards, or other advantage
(taxes, services, donations, etc.).31 There are two types of bribery: active and
passive.32 Active bribery is the act of making a bribe to another person.33 Active
bribery is illegal in both state and federal law, as well as most international law.
In most of those jurisdictions, active bribery is illegal in the public sector
(involving a government or foreign official). Conversely, many jurisdictions
permit active bribery within the private sector (does not involve a government
or foreign official). Passive bribery is the act of requesting a bribe from another
person (as seen with the SLOC scandal above).34 Most jurisdictions35 do not
criminalize passive bribery, especially passive bribery from non-governmental
officials.
This paper focuses on sport business corruption. It provides case studies that
show how the law is enforced to regulate this behavior.

26. Paul Foy, Judge Throws Out Salt Lake City Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/2003/12/06/judge-throws-out-salt-lake-citycase/505c4d94-2a03-462f-836c-961adcaf15e0/.
27. Id.
28. CLARE SAMBROOK & ANDREW JENNINGS, THE GREAT OLYMPIC SWINDLE (2000).
29. Adidas Brand, supra note 2.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2022).
31. Michael Volkov, Navigating Through the FCPA Minefield, Debunking Myths, and Addressing
Red Flags, WORLD COMPLIANCE (Oct. 7, 2010), https://www.mayerbrown.com/public_docs/FCPA_
Powerpoint.pdf.
32. Transparency International UK, Global Anti-Bribery Guidance, TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK,
https://www.antibriberyguidance.org/guidance/5-what-bribery/guidance#2 (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Most jurisdictions including the United States and international jurisdictions.
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I. LEGAL TOOLS TO PREVENT SPORT BUSINESS CORRUPTION
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The main US legal deterrent used against international bribery is the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA was created in 1977 by the US
Congress to criminalize US persons and businesses from making corrupt
payments to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business.36 Although
most countries have anti-bribery laws of their own officials on their books, this
was the first law to extend the criminalization of bribery into a foreign country’s
borders. The FCPA criminalizes individual actors and corporations when the
actors are within the scope of employment, even if the action is contrary to
company policy.37 The corrupt payments requirement includes event tickets,
travel, and entertainment, all of which are common benefits associated with
corporate hospitality activities of a sport sponsorship .38 Sport sponsors should
note that the Department of Justice will be active in pursuing FCPA sport
hospitality violations in the future.39
The FCPA was applied against Weatherford International for a corrupt
hospitality activation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany.40 First, the
FCPA established jurisdiction because despite being a Swiss oil services
corporation, Weatherford had substantial operations in Houston, Texas.41
Weatherford was accused of authorizing bribes with improper travel and
entertainment (including match tickets) to representatives in charge of Algerian
oil contract renewals.42 Ultimately, Weatherford agreed to pay penalties more
than $120 million,43 fined another $1.875 million for lack of cooperation with
the investigation,44 and spent almost $115 million on the investigation.45

36. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2021).
37. RICHARD CASSIN, BRIBERY ABROAD: LESSONS FROM THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
(2008).
38. Id.
39. Jon Jordan, World Tours and the Summer Olympics: Recent Pitfalls Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in the Area of Gifts, Entertainment, and Travel, 21(2) FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 296,
297 (2016).
40. Complaint, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Weatherford Int’l Ltd., No. 4:13-cv-3500 (S.D. Tex.
2013).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC charges Weatherford Int’l with FCPA
Violations (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-252.
45. Richard L. Cassin, Weatherford Pays $152.6 Million for FCPA Violations, $100 Million for
Trade Sanctions, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 26, 2013, 5:08 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2013/11/26/
weatherford-pays-1526-million-for-fcpa-violations-100-millio/.
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Another example is BHP Billiton, an Australian mining company but trades
on the New York Stock Exchange.46 BHP Billiton supplied the materials for the
gold, silver, and bronze medals at the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing,
China.47 Here, BHP Billiton provided event tickets, luxury hotel
accommodations, and sightseeing to Chinese officials and guests of China stateowned steel-making firms.48 BHP Billiton had compliance protocols in place to
help prevent any bribery violations, but the compliance applications were never
reviewed by anyone outside the business unit, and the company failed to train
their employees on bribery risks and prevention.49 However, BHP Billiton selfreported these violations to outside counsel to conduct an intensive internal
investigation, created a compliance group within the legal department that is
separate from its business units, and paid a $25 million fine.50
The outcomes of the cases are significant. Both foreign companies were
under the FCPA jurisdiction despite the corruptive activity occurring at an
international mega-event away from the United States and the bribery itself did
not involve any US citizens.51 Both cases featured common corporate
hospitality elements albeit the benefits were not considered reasonable or bona
fide.52 Perhaps the main difference between the two situations that led to the
drastically different financial penalties was BHP Billiton had compliance
procedures in place, cooperated with the SEC investigation, and made
significant improvements to prevent future corrupt behavior.
Overall, the FCPA had been very aggressive to prevent foreign bribery. This
changed dramatically during the Trump administration. Rucker and Leonnig
(2020) quoted the former President saying, “It’s just so unfair that American
companies aren’t allowed to pay bribes to get business overseas.”53 The Trump
administration continued to prosecute foreign companies but less inclined to
investigate US-based ones.54

46. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges BHP Billiton with Violating FCPA
at Olympic Games (May 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Administrative Proceeding, In re BHP Billiton Ltd., No: 3-16546 (2015).
51. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 44; see Press Release, U.S. Sec.
and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 46.
52. Reasonable or bona fide hospitality expenses are not considered bribery under the FCPA.
FOLEY, FCPA BEST PRACTICES: GIFTS, MEALS, AND ENTERTAINMENT 2, https://www
.foley.com/en/files/uploads/GRS/GRS_FCPA_Best_Practices_Gifts_Meals_and_Entertainment.pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
53. PHILIP RUCKER & CAROL D. LEONNIG, A VERY STABLE GENIUS (2020).
54. Renae Merle, Trump Called Global Anti-bribery Law ‘Horrible.’ His Administration is
Pursuing Fewer New Investigations, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
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B. Federal Crimes and Honest Services Fraud
In 2017, the college basketball world was rocked when the FBI announced
two scandals. The first scandal involved NCAA college basketball coaches who
accepted bribes from financial advisors to influence current players to be
clients.55 The coaches were charged with bribery, conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, Travel Act conspiracy, and honest services fraud.56 The money that
passed from the financial advisors to the NCAA college basketball coaches was
not used to influence the game, but to induce the basketball coaches to use their
relationships with their players to influence the players’ future choice of an
advisor.57 The coaches did not disclose to the players that they were being
compensated for their endorsements providing an excellent example of sports
business fraud.58
The second scandal focused on the Adidas sportswear company funneling
bribe payments to high school basketball players enticing the players to attend
Adidas sponsored colleges in hopes of signing an endorsement contract with
Adidas in the future. It was alleged that Jim Gatto (former Adidas head of global
sports marketing), Merl Code (former Adidas consultant), and Christian
Dawkins (agent for ASM Sports) agreed to pay $100,000 to a recruit’s father
for a player to attend an Adidas school.59 Here, the Adidas executives were
charged with honest services fraud, among other charges.60 The trial ended with
convictions for the three defendants.61 Gatto was sentenced to nine months in
prison, and Dawkins and Code were each sentenced to six months.62
The bribery charge is specific to bribery concerning programs receiving
federal funds, which includes almost every college or university, public or

/business/2020/01/31/trump-fcpa/ (quoting Kristen Savelle, managing director of the Rock Center for
Corporate Governance, Stanford University).
55. Complaint at 6-8, United States v. Evans, No. 19-3643 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
56. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2018) (defining that bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds
may involve corrupt solicitation of anything of value intending to influence a transaction with the
organization or corruptly offering or giving anything of value to an agent of the organization); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (2008) (defining wire fraud as a scheme to defraud which uses wire communication); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (2010) (explaining the interrelations of traveling or using the mail in interstate commerce with
intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity).
57. Complaint at 6-8, United States v. Evans, No. 19-3643 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
58. Id.
59. Complaint at 7, United States v. Gatto, No. 19-0783 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
60. Id.
61. Mark Schlabach, Court Upholds Convictions Against James Gatto, Merl Code, Christian
Dawkins in NCAA Hoop Scandal, ESPN (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.espn.com/mens-collegebasketball/story/_/id/30717983/federal-appeals-court-upholds-convictions-college-hoop-scandal.
62. Id.
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private, in the United States.63 Bribery under this statute involves corrupt
solicitation of anything of value intending to influence a transaction with the
organization or corruptly offering or giving anything of value to an agent of the
organization.64 The payments from Adidas representatives to the families of
high school basketball players were found to be solicitation of a recruit to
influence their attendance at a federally funded university.65 The financial
advisor payments directly to coaches satisfied the criteria for giving value to a
representative of the organization.66
The honest services fraud claim requires a scheme or artifice to defraud or
deprive another of the ‘intangible right’ of honest services.67 Initially the law
was designed to prevent corruption by government officials but the “intangible
right” component gives Federal prosecutors wide discretion to criminalize
conduct in private industry that may not otherwise be illegal.68 The honest
services fraud makes it illegal for executives of a private company to deny the
people they serve the intangible right to honest services occurring as a part of a
scheme where the harm is foreseeable.69 By enticing recruits to attend a specific
school, the Adidas executives and their associates potentially increased the
value of Adidas’ sponsorship of that school, as the program would potentially
be more successful. While the defendants’ claimed the schools benefited from
these actions, the court found the institutions were the victims of the honest
services fraud.70 Each of the schools that were specifically identified through
testimony at trial suffered damage to reputation, and subsequently paid the
tangible costs of investigating the accusations regarding potential violations of
NCAA rules and incurring NCAA penalties for playing athletes that were not
eligible.71
It is interesting that none of the universities reported a crime in these
incidents and none of them dropped Adidas as a sponsor. One school, the
University of Kansas, extended their sponsorship agreement during the
scandal.72

63. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2018).
64. Id.
65. See Schlabach, supra note 61.
66. See id.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018).
68. Los Angeles Criminal Defense Attorney, What is Honest Services Fraud?, WERKSMAN
JACKSON & QUINN LLP, (July 7, 2019), https://werksmanjackson.com/blog/what-is-honest-servicesfraud/.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, 129 (2d Cir. 2021).
71. Id. at 111.
72. Paul Steinbach, Despite Adidas Controversy, Kansas Re-Ups for $196M, ATHLETIC BUS. (Apr.
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C. False Claims Act
Although it is not sport business corruption per se, the Lance Armstrong
doping scandal provides an opportunity to see how sport business corruption
theory might impact competition corruption. During his reign of seven Tour de
France victories, Lance Armstrong injected erythropoietin (EPO).73 EPO
increases the amount of red blood cells in the bloodstream to deliver more
oxygen to fatigued muscles.74 Armstrong denied the blood doping behavior into
his retirement until finally admitting to using the performance enhancing drug
on television to Oprah Winfrey.75
In response to this admission, Armstrong rival, Floyd Landis, used the
private action provision of the False Claims Act to assist Armstrong’s long time
sponsor the United States Postal Service (USPS) to recover its sponsorship
money.76
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) was passed in 1863 to prevent Civil War
supply companies from defrauding the government.77 The FCA creates liability
for any person who knowingly submits a false claim to the government or causes
another to submit a false claim or statement to get a false statement claim paid
by the government.78 The FCA allows private persons to file suit for violations
of the FCA on behalf of the government and if the government intervenes in the
qui tam action, the relator is entitled to receive between 15-25 percent of the
amount recovered by the government through the qui tam action.79 If the
government chooses to obtain recovery in certain types of proceedings other
than the relator’s FCA suit, then the relator is entitled to the same share of the
recovery as if the recovery was obtained through the relator’s FCA suit.80 It is

25, 2019), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/college/despite-adidas-controversy-kansas-re-ups-for-19
6m.html#:~:text=KU%20first%20partnered%20with%20Adidas,signing%20an%20eight%2Dyear%2
0agreement.&text=Former%20Adidas%20employee%20T.J.%20Gassnola,Preston%20and%20Silvio
%20De%20Sousa.
73. Interview by Oprah Winfrey with Lance Armstrong, Former American Cyclist (Jan. 18, 2013).
74. Blood Doping: Types, Risks, and Tests, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/fitness-exercise/
blood-doping#1 (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
75. Interview by Oprah Winfrey with Lance Armstrong, supra note 73.
76. Press Release, Dept. of Just., Off. Pub. Affs., U.S. Joins Lawsuit Alleging Lance Armstrong and
Others Caused the Submission of False Claims to the U.S. Postal Serv. (Feb. 22, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-joins-lawsuit-alleging-lance-armstrong-and-otherscaused-submission-false.
77. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2018); see The False Claims Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/false-claims-act (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
78. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3279-3733.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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important to note that under an FCA lawsuit, damage awards may be trebled.81
In the present case, Armstrong consumed the EPO despite existing
competition penalties associated with blood doping.82 However, the suit alleges
that Armstrong violated the USPS sponsorship contract by using the
performance-enhancing drugs.83 Landis brought the False Claims Act lawsuit
against Armstrong on behalf of the government (USPS).84 “Lance
Armstrong…took more than $30 million from the U.S. Postal Service based on
[his] contractual promise to play fair and abide by the rules- including rules
against doping,” said Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia.85 “The Postal Service has now seen its sponsorship unfairly
associated with what has been described as ‘the most sophisticated,
professionalized, and successful doping program that sport has ever seen.’86
Ultimately, Landis and the USPS sued Armstrong and his cycling team for more
than $90 million.87
CONCLUSION
Sport events (especially mega-events) provide opportunities for sponsors to
commit bribery and other types of corruptive behavior. Corporate hospitality is
a common element of a sport sponsorship, which contains elements that could
easily be used to bribe someone. This situation is important enough that the
United Nations has taken numerous steps to try and prevent it. This paper
showed how US law can be applied to address it. Ultimately, the law, sponsors,
and mega-events need to clean up this behavior.
The simplest recommendation would be an active, and independent,
compliance department within the sponsor. This department should review all
contracts, expenses, and third-party agencies to ensure that proper procedures
are being followed. Unfortunately, because of the Covid impact, many
companies decreased budgets and staff of compliance departments.88
Another recommendation would be including passive bribery into bribery
laws, both US and internationally. The failure to include this element leads to
81. Id.
82. Press Release, Dept. of Just., Off. Pub. Affs., supra note 76.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see Sponsorship Strategy, supra note 2; see Consumer Impressions, supra note 2.
87. Press Release, Dept. of Just., Off. Pub. Affs., supra note 76 (representing the trebled equivalent
of the sponsorship total).
88. Kristin Broughton, Compliance Layoff’s, Budget Cuts Raise Prospect of Looser Internal
Oversight, WALL STREET J. (May 25, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/compliancelayoffs-budget-cuts-raise-prospect-of-looser-internal-oversight-11590404400.
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the corruptive behavior. To paraphrase the Utah court in the Salt Lake City
Olympic scandal, why should the persons asking for bribes be allowed to do
that, when the persons responding to the requests are committing an illegal
action?89 Individual sport governing bodies need to take a zero-tolerance policy
when they deal with passive bribery.
Unethical business organizations will continue to behave corruptly unless
there is a significant deterrent (financial penalty or incarceration). Currently the
FCPA is one such deterrent. Perhaps an enterprising party might create a legal
case using the False Claims Act on behalf of the USOPC against a corrupt
sponsor following the path begun by Floyd Landis and the USPS.
Finally, the mega-events need to police their hospitality areas for bribery
activity. Sponsors who have committed corrupt activities in the past (in sport or
otherwise) should be reviewed extensively prior to creating a business
relationship. Further, properties should only partner with reputable
organizations.

89. See generally United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1087-99 (10th Cir. 2003).

